Sources: On Cooperation With Evil
Also the principle of double effect. (This one has a flowchart!)
This is an entry in the Resources series.
Entries in this series will be more dry and technical, not building toward any particular conclusion – but they will also be very useful, laying down and unpacking foundations that will have a wide range of applicability to many arguments in the future.
One of the most central and critical tenets of Catholic moral theology is that we are obliged to do good and avoid evil – and consequently, the end does not justify the means. In other words, it is never permissible to deliberately choose an evil action – that is: to commit sin – no matter how much good is likely (or certain) to result. The Catechism of the Catholic Church repeatedly echoes and emphasizes this principle:
CCC 1753: A good intention (for example, that of helping one's neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or just. The end does not justify the means. Thus [for example] the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation. On the other hand, an added bad intention (such as vainglory) makes an act evil that, in and of itself, can be good (such as almsgiving).
CCC 1755: A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together. An evil end corrupts the action, even if the object is good in itself (such as praying and fasting “in order to be seen by men”). The object of the choice can by itself vitiate an act in its entirety. There are some concrete acts – such as fornication – that it is always wrong to choose, because choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil.
CCC 1756: It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context. There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.
CCC 1759: “An evil action cannot be justified by reference to a good intention” (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Dec. praec. 6). The end does not justify the means.
CCC 1761: There are concrete acts that it is always wrong to choose, because their choice entails a disorder of the will, i.e., a moral evil. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.
If you are already familiar with this material, you may have recognized that the clearest examples of this principle involve behaviors that are deemed “intrinsically disordered” or “intrinsically evil”. These actions – unlike ordinary actions that are not intrinsically evil, and may be justified (or not) under various circumstances – are by definition always morally disordered and thus always wrong to choose. Unpacking this further is a useful project for understanding what the Catholic Church actually means – and what it does not mean – when it speaks of “intrinsically disordered” actions.
So far, simple enough.
Yet we stand on the verge of a more complex distinction: for even when an action is not intrinsically evil, it may still have an array of multiple effects both good and evil – and although we can never morally desire or choose the evil effect(s), we can sometimes morally choose to tolerate an evil, for the sake of an equal or greater good.
CCC 1737: An effect can be tolerated without being willed by its agent; for instance, a mother's exhaustion from tending her sick child. A bad effect is not imputable if it was not willed either as an end or as a means of an action, e.g., a death a person incurs in aiding someone in danger. For a bad effect to be imputable it must be foreseeable and the agent must have the possibility of avoiding it, as in the case of manslaughter caused by a drunken driver.
There’s a lot happening there, so let’s just zero in on the key claims:
an evil effect can be tolerated without being directly willed
an evil effect is not imputable if it was not willed as a means or an end
an evil effect can be imputable: (1) if it was willed as a means or an end; or (2) if it was reasonably foreseeable and avoidable yet still negligently permitted
Carefully unpacking the implications drawn from all of these principles – again: that we must always choose good actions, and that evil effects can never be directly willed, but may sometimes be knowingly tolerated – eventually leads us to the (quite complex) ethical rule known as the principle of double effect. Perhaps you are already familiar with this – certainly many other explainers (such as this one from EWTN, or this video from Untangle Philosophy on YouTube) have been generated to help explain this before – but here I will attempt to synthesize my own summary, with a few notes:
The Principle of Double Effect
When it is foreseen that both good effect(s) and bad effect(s) will be caused by an action, one may perform that action only if these four conditions are satisfied:
The action must be materially good – in object, motive, and circumstances.
In other words: your proposed action cannot be intrinsically evil; neither can it be an otherwise good action that has been corrupted by an evil motive, or rendered gravely harmful or imprudent by intervening circumstances.
Only the good effect(s) can be formally intended. The bad effect(s) can never be formally or directly willed, but only foreseen, unintended but tolerated.
Note that if an evil effect could be easily avoided or mitigated, there would be a corresponding moral obligation to make that attempt. Negligent disregard for an evil effect that could be avoided or minimized is unjustifiable.
The good effect(s) cannot arise through the bad effect(s).
To hold otherwise would mean intending to cause the evil in order to bring about the desired good – that is: to hold that the (good) end justifies the (evil) means.
The bad effect(s) cannot outweigh the good effect(s). The good effect(s) must be at least proportionate, if not greater, to compensate for the bad effect(s).
Failure to meet any one of these conditions renders the action morally unjustifiable.
While the earliest known example of this ethical doctrine comes from Saint Thomas Aquinas (in Summa Theologiae, II.2, Q.64: A.7, on the question of unintended killing in self-defense), the principle was further developed by later moral theologians.
Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P., (1866–1931) was a Dominican priest, canon lawyer, and theology professor at the University of Fribourg.
Here below I will be presenting the 1956 English translation of Prümmer’s text in a slightly reorganized and lightly edited format, with minimal alterations to the original terminology.In Dominic Prümmer, OP’s Handbook of Moral Theology, he outlines a very similar four-point ethical framework, under the heading of “Indirectly Voluntary Acts” (nn. 23-24). Before proceeding, we should note that these are distinguished from “directly voluntary” acts – and Prümmer explains this distinction in the following way (n. 22):
An act is directly voluntary if it is an immediate object of the will and desired in itself; for instance, a thief directly intends his stealing.
An act is indirectly voluntary if the will intends some [good] object necessarily connected with an immediate [bad] object. Thus, the act of throwing cargo overboard in order to avoid shipwreck is indirectly voluntary: it is not desired in itself, but detested; however, since it is the only means of saving life, it is done.
Footnote: The divisions of voluntary acts as given above are not explained in the same way by everyone. Therefore care must be taken to avoid confusion.
Here, then, we find essentially another version of the double effect principle (n. 23):
It is lawful to perform an act in spite of a foreseen evil effect, provided that:
the act is good in itself, or at least indifferent;
its immediate effect is good;
the intention of the agent is good;
the agent has a proportionately grave reason for acting.
The same principle may be expressed in this way:
Four conditions have to be verified before the agent is permitted to allow an indirectly voluntary act that is evil: (1) the cause of the evil act is in itself good or indifferent; (2) the immediate effect is good; (3) the agent’s purpose is good; (4) there exists a proportionately grave reason.
And an explanation is then provided for each of the four requirements (nn. 23-24):
First and foremost it is essential that the act which produces the evil effect be good in itself, or at least indifferent. Thus one is never allowed to commit actions that are themselves evil (lying, blasphemy, fornication) even though an excellent result is expected to follow from them. In practice it is [often] possible to decide whether an act is good in itself or indifferent by asking whether the agent has the right (absolutely speaking) to perform such an act. For example, an innkeeper has the right (absolutely speaking) to offer wine for sale; consequently this act is good or at least indifferent, even though it happens to be connected with the sin of drunkenness. On the other hand, no one has the right to directly kill an innocent person, and therefore the action of a doctor in directly procuring an abortion is intrinsically evil.
It is also necessary that the immediate effect of the act be good – that is to say, the evil effect must come after and not before the good effect. Let us not do evil that good may come (cf. Romans 3:8). This condition does not differ greatly from the first. For if the immediate effect of the act is evil, the act itself must also be evil.
The agent must have a good intention. Although a good intention does not justify the use of evil means, nevertheless an evil intention debases everything, including the means taken to achieve it.
The agent must have a proportionately grave reason for acting and permitting the evil effect, which – though not intended by the agent – remains a material sin, and frequently engenders a grave risk of formal sin. Material sin or the danger of formal sin cannot be permitted without a proportionately grave reason.
In judging proportionality, the following should be taken as the general rule:
(1) The greater the evil effect that is indirectly willed; and
(2) the closer the union between the act and its evil effect; and
(3) the greater the certainty that the evil effect will ensue; and
(4) the greater the agent’s obligation to prevent the evil effect;
so much the more serious must be the reason for permitting the evil effect.
Hold on, what about “cooperation with evil”?
Wasn’t that the whole point of this resources entry?
Well, yes.
But there is a subtle link between the principle of double effect, and the moral rules governing “cooperation” with evil. For as Prümmer observes, when discussing the sinfulness of cooperation in this later section of his text (n. 234):
Formal cooperation in the sin of another is always sinful, because formal cooperation includes consent to another’s sin.
Material cooperation is sometimes permitted. This is because material cooperation is in itself a good act that is abused by another person through malice. Therefore everything regarding acts that are indirectly voluntary can be applied here, and is used to solve cases that frequently arise on matters relating to the cooperation of subordinates, employees, vendors, etc.
In other words, formal consent to evil (or sin) is a directly voluntary act.
Meanwhile a decision to tolerate evil (or sin) for the sake of another good brings us into the realm of appreciating consequences that are indirectly voluntary.
Let us reflect again upon Prümmer’s earlier example: the act of throwing cargo overboard, in order to avoid shipwreck. The loss of valuable cargo is by no means something directly willed – in fact, it is detested, and if there were any realistic hope of avoiding it, that alternative would (and should!) be pursued instead. Nevertheless there remains a real choice being made – a voluntary act of the will – by which you are consenting to indirectly accept the undesired evil, for the sake of whatever good you directly desire to achieve (avoiding shipwreck). Indeed in this case you might even actively materially cooperate in bringing about the evil effect (by helping throw cargo overboard), since that material action is not intrinsically evil, and is also subjectively justified by a proportionately grave cause.
But the deeper point is this: even if you do not materially cooperate in bringing about the evil effect, making a voluntarily choice to tolerate or permit the undesired evil remains (in a real sense) a form of “indirectly” willing the evil effect, for the sake of something else. This uncomfortable middle ground is flanked by two opposite extremes: on the one hand, directly willing the evil and working to bring it about; or on the other hand, directly willing against the evil and working to prevent it from being achieved. A choice in favor of passive acceptance or toleration – even if it is fully subjectively justified in a particular case! – ultimately remains an act of the will accepting the evil in a qualified sense, and therefore it can be termed “indirectly voluntary”.
Finally, we should briefly examine Prümmer’s traditional framework for naming and distinguishing the definition and kinds of cooperation with evil (n. 233):
Cooperation in evil is concurrence with another’s sinful act. Cooperation differs from scandal, insofar as scandal causes the evil will of the sinner (by advice, by command, or by example), whereas cooperation presupposes the evil will of the sinner, and is a means of bringing their evil will to completion in an external act.
Cooperation is immediate if it is cooperation in the actual sinful act of another [for example: an accomplice in the act of murder].
Cooperation is mediate if it provides other acts or objects that are not so intimately connected with the actual sinful act of another.
Mediate cooperation is proximate if it is immediately connected with the sinful action of another [for example: selling poison to a murderer].
Mediate cooperation is remote if it is not so immediately connected with the sinful action of another [for example: selling a gun to an irresponsible owner who may someday use it badly].
Cooperation is formal if help is given in order to commit sin understood as a sin. Formal cooperation is an act that is evil in itself, both because of its object and because of the intention of the cooperating agent.
Cooperation is material if one cooperates in the physical action only. Material cooperation is an action that is good in itself, but which is abused by another in order to commit sin.
You are now ready for…
The Flowchart
Originally designed by David Rummelhoff for EpicPew (click here to view the full image), we will walk through this step by step, with a little added commentary:
If the proposed action that you would commit is itself deemed intrinsically evil – or if it is otherwise formally forbidden by the law of the Church – then it’s game over.
But if it’s not intrinsically evil, and not forbidden by canon law, we can keep going.
If your action will indeed help “bring the evil will of another to completion in an external act”, then we are dealing precisely with a question of cooperation with sin. Otherwise, this flowchart isn’t for you. (So arguably, this really should have been the very first question on the flowchart; but it doesn’t make a significant difference.)
Formal cooperation is always sinful, because it includes consent to another’s sin.
Otherwise, we are dealing with merely material cooperation, and we keep going.
Here we have a slight divergence from Prümmer’s definition – according to which immediate material cooperation would be cooperation in the actual sinful act of another person (e.g. acting as an accomplice in the act of murder), while providing something essential to the evil act (e.g. selling poison to a murderer) might be better classified under the heading of proximate (but still mediate) material cooperation. Nevertheless, you can see how those two examples differ by only the thinnest hair – indeed both are “accomplices” to different degrees – and thus we still reach the same conclusion.
Here, the notion of “scandal” must be understood properly – not in the broad sense of provoking “wonderment” among others, but in the narrow sense of leading another to do evil (by advice, by command, or by example). We should also keep in mind that any likelihood of a false appearance of sin that our behavior might evoke can be naturally mitigated through appropriate transparency, education, and clarification whenever concerns are raised – thereby rendering any danger of scandal less likely.
Finally, if there is no good effect that your cooperation could accomplish, then there is (naturally) no reason for cooperating in the first place! But if there is some good effect (that you directly desire to achieve by your cooperation) then we are dealing with a form of double effect moral analysis, and the proportionality of the good effect(s) against the evil effect(s) becomes central for discernment.
Here it is useful to revisit Prümmer’s general rule for judging proportionality. The good effect(s) that you are hopeful or certain you will achieve – that is, the gravity of your justification for cooperating with (and tolerating the undesired evil effects from) an action must increase in proportion with any/all of the following factors:
the greater the gravity of the evil effect(s);
the greater the proximity between your action and the evil effect(s);
the greater the certainty that the evil effect(s) will follow from your action;
the greater your obligation to prevent the evil effect(s).
Approached inversely, the gravity of your justification for cooperating (and tolerating undesired evil effects) decreases in proportion with any/all of the following factors:
the lesser the gravity of the evil effect(s);
the lesser the proximity between your action and the evil effect(s);
the lesser the certainty that the evil effect(s) will follow from your action;
the lesser your obligation to prevent the evil effect(s).
These are not always simple questions to resolve.1
Some cases are (or ought to be) more intuitive: for instance, in wartime, where far too often the critical discernment of proportionality for violence is neglected or even dismissed – to the point that certainly killing hundreds and thousands of innocents is rationalized as “necessary” collateral damage in order to achieve a good result.2
Other cases are genuinely complex: for instance, in voting, where the proximity between a vote and an evil effect might be very attenuated; and where there is a difference between directly voting to create a law, vs. voting to elect a representative (who in turn may not even certainly advance various good or bad laws during their time in office); and where there is a critical difference between a law that protects or tolerates the choice of an evil, vs. a law that directly requires an evil to be done.
But in the end, this rule remains:
We may not do evil so that good may result from it.
Toleration of an evil (even material cooperation with bringing about an undesired evil!) may sometimes be morally possible. But even if the simpler conditions are verified, the final stage of discernment – verifying a proportionate reason for personal action – can sometimes become highly subjective, requiring the prudent response of a well-formed conscience under complex, particular circumstances.
Therefore, especially in more difficult cases, seeking the guidance of close friends, trusted mentors, and reliable spiritual directors may be very useful (if not practically required) as a reality check, to help safeguard against self-deception or excessive scrupulosity. In any case, self-critical discernment is essential, and any confidence we have must be balanced by an equal portion of humility. This means genuine openness to hearing perspectives raised by others, and potential openness to conversion and changing or modifying our behavior in the future, if we are convinced by better arguments, new perspectives, and/or by our own further study and reflection.
Indeed, as Elizabeth Anscombe observed in her 1961 essay on “War and Murder”, there can be a very real danger of falling into disastrous “double-think about double effect”.
The denial of [the principle of “double effect”] has been the corruption of non-Catholic thought, and its abuse the corruption of Catholic thought. (pg. 46)
The idea that [one can simply] not intend the death of those they attack, has been put forward and, when suitably expressed, may seem high-minded. But someone who can fool himself into this twist of thought will fool himself into justifying anything, however atrocious, by means of it. (pg. 45, footnote)
The distinction between the intended, and the merely foreseen, effects of a voluntary action is indeed absolutely essential to Christian ethics. […] Without understanding of this principle, anything can be – and is wont to be – justified, and the Christian teaching that in no circumstances may one commit murder, adultery, apostasy [etc.] goes by the board. These absolute prohibitions of Christianity by no means exhaust its ethic; there is a large area where what is just is determined partly by a prudent weighing up of consequences. But the prohibitions are bedrock, and without them the Christian ethic goes to pieces. Hence the necessity of the notion of double effect.
At the same time, the principle has been repeatedly abused from the seventeenth century up till now [because] what may be called Cartesian psychology has dominated the thought of philosophers and theologians. According to this psychology, an intention was an interior act of the mind which could be produced at will. Now if intention is all important – as it is – in determining the goodness or badness of an action, then, on this theory of what intention is, a marvellous way offered itself of making any action lawful. You only had to “direct your intention” in a suitable way. In practice, this means making a little speech to yourself: “What I mean to be doing is…”
This perverse doctrine has occasioned repeated condemnations by the Holy See from the seventeenth century to the present day. […] This same doctrine is used to prevent any doubts about the obliteration bombing of a city. The devout Catholic bomber secures by a “direction of intention” that any shedding of innocent blood that occurs is “accidental”. I know a Catholic boy who was puzzled at being told by his schoolmaster that it was an accident that the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were there to be killed; in fact, however absurd it seems, such thoughts are common among priests who know that they are forbidden by the divine law to justify the direct killing of the innocent. It is nonsense to pretend that you do not intend to do what is the means you take to your chosen end. Otherwise there is absolutely no substance to the Pauline teaching that we may not do evil that good may come. (pgs. 50-51)
Since the full Tangle essay requires a subscription, I will here include a lengthy selection of citation-heavy paragraphs from behind the paywall, which vividly convey an almost overwhelming array of examples of absolutely unjustifiable wartime actions:
This month, the Israeli organization B'Tselem released a 118-page report on human rights abuses inflicted upon Palestinian prisoners by Israel, including grotesque sexual violence, food deprivation, and other forms of torture. In June, The New York Times released a lengthy investigative piece about Sde Teiman, a prison where many of these abuses have been reported. The evidence has become so overwhelming for these crimes that Israeli analysts I follow have expressed deep shame for initially believing the government’s denials.
And amidst these stories, some Israeli politicians have stormed the military base where soldiers accused of these atrocities were being held; not in protest against their crimes, but in protest of the fact the crimes were being prosecuted. […] Lawmaker Hanoch Milwidsky, a member of Netanyahu’s Likud party, argued that any action – even sexual violence – is permissible if it’s done to a Hamas militant.
[…] We've seen aid workers killed in safe zones, soldiers shooting aimlessly at residential buildings, and civilian infrastructure completely destroyed. The IDF even killed three of their own citizens they were trying to rescue. When it successfully rescued citizens taken hostage by Hamas, the IDF killed close to 300 people in the process (with many women and children found in the rubble). It recently struck a designated humanitarian safe zone, killing 90 and wounding around 300 others, in order to kill a pair of Hamas leaders. […] And in the middle of it all, there have many instances of politicians and regular Israeli citizens blocking or attacking aid trucks from entering Gaza.
[…] In perhaps the sickest twist of all, a handful of Israeli soldiers have now been documented doing one of the very worst things Hamas does: Using people as human shields in war. Israeli soldiers have been recorded using a shop owner as a shield during a raid, or strapping a 24-year-old to the hood of a jeep that was driving through Gaza.
By the way, I wrote the preceding paragraph last week, linking to a tweet citing several other examples of Israeli soldiers using Palestinians as human shields. Then on Tuesday, while continuing to work on this piece, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz released a lengthy investigative article detailing examples of Israeli soldiers using Palestinians as human shields that I had not yet seen. According to Haaretz, the IDF has been forcing handcuffed Palestinians to walk through areas thought to contain booby traps or explosive devices.
These are just a few stories from the last few months, only from Gaza, and only from this war. […] In a conflict that appears to have killed tens of thousands of people in 10 months, this is but a fraction of the horror – if we are willing to see it.
[…] I am not arguing that Israel is uniquely awful or that this war is any better or worse than the ones that preceded it. I’m not arguing that it’s worse than what is happening in Yemen or to the Uyghurs or in combat zones in Africa. I don’t need to do those things. There is no point in doing those things. I’m just showing you what this war is like. I am telling you that Israel has lost its moral authority. […] Take it from Wes Bryant, a retired master sergeant who wrote a whole book about his experience leading the fight against ISIS, and is now part of a nonpartisan task force analyzing Israel’s actions. He has condemned the IDF outright, explained what the overwhelming evidence tells us, and criticized less experienced “analysts” who are spreading misinformation that Israel’s attempts to prevent civilian suffering are uniquely effective.
[…] If you continue to support the war, you must grapple with the reality of what people are experiencing on the ground. You cannot invent a future hypothetical – a positive outcome from continuing this fight – while ignoring the present reality. Doing that isn't just. It isn't humane. It isn't fair to Palestinians. It isn’t intellectually honest.
And it’s now clear to me that Israel is not conducting this war from some kind of remarkable moral high ground. They may be doing some things better or differently than other nations, like dropping leaflets before they destroy a neighborhood or evacuating civilians before taking over in their tanks. But the effectiveness of those actions is entirely unclear, and while I’d rather they take measures to protect innocents than not, those laudable efforts do not somehow absolve them of the very plain outcomes we can all see.
If Israel’s army were operating with moral authority and restraint, I wouldn’t so easily be able to find the dozens of examples I’ve cited in this newsletter (and that’s just scratching the surface). Entire organizations made up of Israeli soldiers wouldn’t be telling the truth about their experiences. Lifelong Zionists like me wouldn’t be changing their tune about the war. There wouldn’t be these firsthand accounts, these details, these videos, these images, these deplorable public comments – these are not the signs of a just and noble war. These are not actions that make me proud of my people's ancestral homeland, nor actions that give me trust in Israel's leaders, nor actions that will ever bring peace or reconciliation between two warring populations.